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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
:

Case No. 20020879-CA

:

INCARCERATED

PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,
v.
DOMINIQUE HERNANDEZ,
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT.

JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this first degree
felony case transferred from the Utah Supreme Court (R. 251).
ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION
1. Does the erroneous reasonable doubt instruction require a new trial?
Jury instructions are reviewed on appeal for correctness, with no deference to the trial
court. See, e ^ , State v. Reves. 2004 UT App 8 at If 14, 84 P.3d 841.
This issue was not raised below, and in raising it for the first time on appeal,
Hernandez asserts the plain error, exceptional circumstances, and ineffective assistance of
counsel doctrines.
2. Does ineffective assistance of trial counsel require a new trial?
This Court reviews claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for correctness, See,
e.g.. State v.Maestas. 1999 UT 32, If 20,984 P.2d 376, deferring to the trial court's findings

of fact after a .. •.. Hearing, Mate v. Wright, 2004 UT App 102, ^ 7, 90 P.3d 644.
h- Utah R. App. P. 23B(R. 266-268,
375-402, R. 470-75).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULE
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ineffective assistance by trial counsel (R. 470-75).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
FACTS ESTABLISHED AT TRIAL
John Nieser testified that on December 4, 2001, at about 6:30 p.m., he was near
Freeway Transmissions located at 847 West 1017 South, when a man approached, said hello,
stuck a gun in his face, and told him to give him is wallet or else (R. 254 at 12-15). Nieser
gave him his wallet containing about $774 in cash, and the robber told him to get back in his
truck and not follow him (R. 254 at 17-18).
The robbery lasted from four to five minutes (R. 254 at 19), and that there was a light
right across the street on the north side of 17th South right across from the building (R. 254
at 19). On cross-examination he conceded that the area was not well lit, and it was dark at
that time of day (R. 254 at 34). On re-direct, he maintained that the streetlight provided
enough light for him to see the robber's face (R. 254 at 46-47).
He said his blood pressure was sky high during the robbery (R. 254 at 36).
He said that after the robbery, he sat in his truck for about five minutes so his heart
rate would go down, because he had had two heart attacks the year before and was very
worried about having another (R. 254 at 19-20).
At the preliminary hearing, he said he sat in his truck for five to ten minutes after the
robbery before going inside Freeway Transmission to report it (R. 253 at 5).
When the prosecutor asked Nieser if he was trying to look at the robber to see what

3

he looked like and was wearing, Nieser said he noticed the robber's clothes (R. 254 at 21).
He told dispatch that the robber was a male Hispanic, about twenty years old, five feet eight
inches tall, and about one hundred and sixty pounds (R. 254 at 21-22). He told dispatch the
robber had short brown hair and had a goatee and facial hair that looked like he had not
shaved for a day (R. 254 at 22). The robber had a blue shirt with writing on the front of it
(R. 254 at 22). The pants were black baggy pants with big pockets (R. 254 at 23). The
robber also had white tennis shoes (R. 254 at 23). Dispatch also asked the direction the
robber was headed (R. 254 at 23).
Nieser saw the police driving around the neighborhood of Freeway Transmission
within a couple of minutes of his call, and they stopped about five minutes later (R. 254 at
36). Within an hour, Detective Wallace and another officer came and got him and told him
they "had a suspect that fit the description and wanted to know if [Nieser] could ID him." (R.
254 at 23-24, 44).
The police brought Hernandez out into the parking lot and put him next to a wall and
shined headlights and a spot light on him (R. 254 at 24, 39). There was other lighting also
and the area was very well lit (R. 254 at 40). When they began the show-up, Nieser said it
was too bright and they turned the lights down at his request (R. 254 at 41). Nieser viewed
Hernandez for five to ten minutes from a distance of 37 feet (R. 254 at 25). Nieser
recognized Hernandez, but told the police his shirt was different (R. 254 at 25). Hernandez
appeared Hispanic, with the same height and weight he had described (R. 254 at 25). He was
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wearing black baggy pants with big pockets, and white tennis shoes, and had scraggly facial
hair (R. 254 at 26). He was wearing a different shirt, which was black, and after they lifted
a few of the suspects shirts up, there was a blue one with writing on it, the same shirt as the
robber wore (R. 254 at 26,41). There was nothing about Hernandez that did not match the
robber (R. 254 at 27).
Nieser told the police his heart rate was up and he was worried, but he did not say he
might not be sure, but said he was 100 percent sure after he cleared up the shirt problem (R.
254 at 41).
He maintained that the lettering on the shirt was three to four inches tall, and testified
that he had never testified that it was across the side, because the writing was across the front
(R. 254 at 42). He maintained that the portion of the preliminary hearing transcript, which
said the writing was across the side, should have reflected that the writing was on the front
of the shirt (R. 254 at 42).
The prosecutor, apparently trying to minimize the discrepancy between the weight of
the robber provided by Nieser, 160 pounds, and Hernandez's actual weight recorded one
week after his arrest, 145 pounds (R. 254 at 75), led Nieser to testify that Hernandez's outer
shirt was baggy, giving the impression that he was heavier than he was (R. 254 at 28). When
trial counsel pointed out that the robber was supposedly not wearing this outer shirt during
the robbery (R. 254 at 43), Nieser testified on re-direct that the robber's blue shirt was also
baggy, depending on how he moved (R. 254 at 47).
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Nieser maintained that the robber did not I lave any outer clothing, just a short sleeved
shirt, and was not wearing any bandana (R. 254 at 47-48).
Nieser maintained that Hernandez was the robber, the same person he identified at the
preliminary hearing, and that Hernandez had a smirk at the preliminary hearing like he did
in the robbery, and like he did in the photo of the show-up (R. 254 at 29-30).
Nieser was wearing one inch heels during the robbery, and had testified at the
preliminary hearing that the robber was his height, 57" or 5*8" (R. 254 at 31, 37-38), but
could not recall having told the dispatcher that the robber's height was between 5f8" and
5' 10" (R. 254 at 3 8). The robber was just over an arm5 s length away from him, and he stared
at him for several minutes and believed the person was the same height (R. 254 at 46).
Hernandez is 5f4,f (R. 254 at 75).
When defense counsel alluded to Nieser's preliminary hearing testimony regarding
why the robber looked Hispanic and asked him why he did, Nieser testified, "I don't know,
he just did. He looked Hispanic to me." (R. 254 at 37). He did not notice any accent, and
it was not Hernandez's coloring or his size or anything else that made him seem Hispanic (R.
254 at 37). When counsel asked Nieser if he remembered saying that the person's goatee and
hairdo made him look Hispanic, he said he did, and also recalled denying that a certain hairdo
and goatee meant a person was Hispanic (R. 254 at 44). He did not recall having said that
he thought the suspect was Hispanic because his heart rate was up and it was dark at Freeway
Transmission (R. 254 at 44).
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He did not tell dispatch about scarring or jewelry, but Hernandez' forehead was
scarred and he had an earring in his left ear on the night of his arrest (R. 254 at 45).
Nieser did not recall not remembering the robber's shoes at the preliminary hearing
(R. 254 at 39). He remembered telling dispatch about the shoes, but later may have forgotten
that detail (R. 254 at 39).
He identified the gun in evidence as positively being the same gun used by the robber,
although the gun in evidence does not match either the description given to dispatch (black)
or the description he provided at the preliminary hearing (grey with a silver or chrome part)
(R. 254 at 15, 34-35).
Officer Rich Brede heard the dispatch broadcast an attempt to locate the armed robber
at 6:39 p.m. (R. 254 at 49-52). The robber was male, Hispanic, in his twenties, with black
pants, a blue shirt, and a scruffy beard or moustache (R. 254 at 52-53). The gun used by the
robber was black (R. 254 at 74). The robber was originally reported to be running Eastbound
(R. 254 at 64). He got a supplemental dispatch indicating that the suspect may have been
wearing white tennis shoes and running Southbound from the scene of the robbery, 780 West
and 1700 South (R. 254 at 54, 63). They investigated various businesses in the area and
ended up going to the Flying J on 2400 South and 900 West, which was open twenty four
hours a day, and south of the robbery (R. 254 at 54-55).
They checked the various parts of the building, and found Hernandez sitting in the
trucker's television lounge and felt that he matched the description (R. 254 at 55-56). He
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appeared to be a male Hispanic in his twenties, and he had white athletic shoes, facial hair
and hair style matching the description, and clothing that were very similar to the broadcast
description (R. 254 at 55, 67). At the preliminary hearing, Brede testified that Hernandez
looked Caucasian or white, as he did in court (R. 254 at 66). Brede thought Hernandez was
the only one who looked close to the description (R. 254 at 67).
Hernandez is 5'4" and weighed 145 pounds a week after the arrest (R. 254 at 75). He
was wearing a bandana around his neck at the time of his arrest (R. 254 at 75). Hernandez
was wearing black pants, a dark pullover top or jacket or sweatshirt with a hood and white
shoes (R. 254 at 67-68). It was cold outside that night (R. 254 at 74).
The officers approached Hernandez and asked him to go to a stairwell outside the
television room so they could have some privacy from the other people in the room (R. 254
at 56). Because a handgun had been used, Mclnnes frisked Hernandez (R. 254 at 56).
Before the frisk, Hernandez denied having a gun, but after Mclnnes said he was going to
frisk him, Hernandez said he had a gun in his waistband (R. 254 at 56-57). The officers took
control of his hands, Brede took the gun from Hernandez's left front waistband, and Mclnnes
cuffed him (R. 254 at 57, 76). The gun had one round in the chamber and four in the
magazine (R. 254 at 58).
Hernandez spontaneously told the police that he had bought it recently
and told Mclnnes he could have the gun (R. 254 at 59).
Brede took Hernandez's pulse, because he thought it might show that he had been
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running (R. 254 at 61). His pulse was rapid (R. 254 at 62). Brede was not aware of
Hernandez' normal pulse rate, and was no expert on whether the rapid pulse he felt was
normal for Hernandez (R. 254 at 76). His report did not indicate that Hernandez was
sweating, and Brede did not recall that he was (R. 254 at 76).
Brede notified dispatch that he had the suspect in custody at 7:09 p.m. (R. 254 at 62).
Hernandez had a wallet with an ID card in it, but the police did not ask Nieser if it was
his wallet (R. 254 at 68). Hernandez had a Greyhound ticket, a hat that he may have been
wearing, a zippered pouch, his driver's license, and a cell phone (R. 254 at 68-69).
Hernandez had a pillow case containing several books and a notebook containing computer
disks (R. 254 at 70). Brede did not discuss these items with Hernandez, and did not believe
that any of these items came from Nieser (R. 254 at 71).
After Mclnnes took Hernandez to the show-up, Brede talked to Paul Ardis, who was
in the Flying J Truck stop and who said that Mr. Hernandez had been at the truck stop some
considerable time, although he did not say Hernandez was there when the robbery occurred
(R. 254 at 72,79). Ardis said he had been talking with Hernandez at the truck stop two hours
earlier, at about 5:16, and that Ardis had come into the trucker's lounge at 6:56 and saw
Hernandez in there at that time (R. 254 at 80-81). Brede did not ask Ardis how long Ardis
had been out of the lounge before he came back in at 6:56 (R. 254 at 81).
There were four to six other people in the television area where Hernandez was
originally found, but Brede did not interview them (R. 254 at 77).
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Brede did not find any amount of cash on Hernandez approaching or exceeding $700,
despite searching the area where Hernandez had been, and searching the area between the
site of the robbery and the truck stop (R. 254 at 77-80).
Detective Michelle Ross Mirandized Hernandez, and he agreed to talk to her without
an attorney present (R. 254 at 85). He told her he got a ride to the truck stop from a truck
driver (R. 254 at 85). He said the truck driver gave him the gun the police took from him for
his own protection (R. 254 at 86). Mr. Hernandez asked her to talk to some people at the
truck stop who could verify that he had been at the truck stop and had not left, but she did
not interview them (R. 254 at 88).
Officer Jon Wallace got a dispatch report of a suspect in custody at about 7:00, and
took Nieser from Freeway Transmissions to the truck stop and described him as being very
nervous and stressed (R. 254 at 89). He told Nieser that "there was a possible" and asked
him to come and "get a positive identification to see if it was the same person." (R. 254 at
90). Nieser was in the back of his car, and when they got to the truck stop, the police already
had the suspect outside, and Wallace shone his lights on the suspect, who was about thirty
feet away from his car, to illuminate him and hide Nieser (R. 254 at 90).
He told Nieser to look at the suspect, take his time, study his features and see if he
could positively identify him as the robber (R. 254 at 91). Nieser said the suspect looked like
the robber, but had a different shirt on than the robber did (R. 254 at 91) Wallace had the
officers lift Hernandez's shirts so Nieser could see each one (R. 254 at 91). Nieser said one
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of the shirts was the one the robber was wearing and he was positive of that (R. 254 at 92).
He identified Hernandez as the robber (R. 254 at 92).
Hernandez told Wallace that witnesses in the truck stop could vouch for the fact that
he was there at the time of the robbery, but the only one Wallace interviewed was Lamar
Franklin, who said he was just passing through and could not vouch for Hernandez (R. 254
at 93).
FACTS PERTAINING TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
Trial counsel did not take an adequate opportunity to prepare his case with Mr.
Hernandez prior to trial, due to a variety of circumstances, including Hernandez's repeated
transfers between state and federal correctional and detention facilities, trial counsel's
unavailability, and trial counsel's failure to move for a continuance. See Rule 23B Affidavit
of Trial Counsel (Defendant's Exhibit 17).1
Trial counsel did not know how to reach Hernandez prior to trial because Hernandez
was in federal custody, and he made no effort to reach him (R. 478 at 46).
Before trial, the most time trial counsel spent with Hernandez was sitting next to him

lending trial, Hernandez was in federal custody in various locations including the
Weber County Jail (R. 29-34), in Daggett County, and at the Adult Detention Center (R.
253 at 30). Various hearings had to be continued because he was not transported from
remote locations. See District Court docket sheet. Prior to the trial, he was sentenced to a
federal prison in Arizona, and the trial had to be continued so he could return for trial.
See District Court docket sheet. The district court docket sheet confirms that trial counsel
was not present at the scheduling conference on May 28, 2002, or pretrial conference on
July 30, 2002 in district court. See also R. 478 at 13-14, 16.
11

at the preliminary hearing (R. 478 at 75).
Trial counsel never filed a motion to suppress the gun and Mr. Hernandez's statements
on Fourth Amendment grounds.
Trial counsel never filed a motion to suppress the eye-witness identification of
Hernandez on Article I § 7 grounds.
FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE AND PRESENT KEY DEFENSE EVIDENCE
According to Nieser's preliminary hearing and trial testimony, the robbery began at
about 6:30 and lasted four to five minutes, and he waited between five and ten minutes
before he went inside to report it (R. 254 at 12-15, 19-20, R. 253 at 5). Dispatch broadcast
his complaint to the police at 6:39 (R. 254 at 49-52).
Prior to trial, Hernandez told trial counsel that prior to his arrest, he had been on the
phone with his relatives and was waiting for a money transfer from his family at or near the
time of the robbery, but trial counsel did not investigate or present this evidence (R. 478 at
14-16,28-30,39-40,87).
He had no strategic reason for failing to investigate how Hernandez arranged for the
money transfer (R. 478 at 88).
Trial counsel could not recall exactly what or when Hernandez told him, but believed
that counsel had taken a note sometime prior to trial indicating that Hernandez said it was not
him, that he was located an hour later, and that he may have an alibi (R. 478 at 50-51;
Defendant's Exhibit 4). Trial counsel did not think he had the names and phone numbers of
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Hernandez's relatives prior to trial, but he was not sure about that (R. 478 at 87). He
conceded that he should have investigated, based on the note (R. 478 at 91).
Trial counsel knew that one or two days before trial, Hernandez asked him if he had
tracked down the people he was on the phone with, and trial counsel realized that he had not
investigated the defense Hernandez had previously told him about (R. 478 at 47). He had no
strategic reason for failing to investigate the defense (R. 478 at 87). Trial counsel felt it was
too late to do anything about it, and opted to go with the defense he was planning (R. 478 at
47).
He did not consider moving for a continuance (R. 478 at 48).
Trial counsel explained that his own mother had suffered a stroke and died in the
months prior to Hernandez's preliminary hearing, and that counsel had been taking Xanax
to combat depression, and that this resulted in loss of significant memories, such as entire
conversations he had had (R. 478 at 43, 48, 84-85).

This may have influenced his

performance in this case (R. 478 at 48).
At some point prior to the deadline for filing a motion for a new trial, trial counsel's
office received word that there were phone records supporting Hernandez's claim that he was
at the Flying J Truck stop at the time of the robbery. See Rule 23B Affidavit of Trial
Counsel (Defendant's Exhibit 17); Defendant's Exhibit 5 and State's Exhibit 7 (phone memo
dated 10/10 at 10:47 a.m., provided from the Legal Defender's file, indicating that
Hernandez had left word for trial counsel that his aunt, Amanda Hernandez, had "the phone
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transcripts for his appeal" and could be reached at a certain number).
A subsequent investigation by the office confirmed that there are phone records
indicating that Hernandez's aunt, Amanda Hernandez, was on the phone with someone at the
Flying J Truck stop on December 5, 2001, for seven minutes, beginning at 6:22 p.m. See
Defendant's Exhibits 6 and 21 (telephone bill of Amanda Hernandez); State's Exhibit 1
(Affidavit of Kath Panteloglow); R. 478 at 52-55).
Legal Defenders also obtained a phone record confirming that someone from the
Flying J Truck stop called Margaret Puebla's number, (307)-332-7973, at 6:53 p.m. See
Defendant's Exhibit 12 and 13 (AMA dump and instruction sheet on how to read AMA
Dump record, faxed to Legal Defender's Association on November 6,2002); State's Exhibit
3 (Affidavit of Kath Panteloglow).
The Legal Defenders Association also received a fax from Hernandez's grandmother,
Margaret Puebla, confirming that she had tried to send Hernandez a Western Union money
transfer in the amount of $45 on December 5, 2001, which was sent at 21:58 Eastern
Standard Time, but was refunded to her on December 12, 2001. See Defendant's Exhibit 7
(phone memo dated 11/1 at 1:51 p.m., provided from the Legal Defender's file, indicating
that Margaret Puebla had left word for trial counsel that she would fax something over and
could be reached at a certain number); Defendant's Exhibits 8 and 22 (Western Union fax
dated November 1, 2002, reflecting money transfer from Puebla sent to Dominique Nicka
Hernandez on December 5,2002, which was later refunded oii Decemta i 12,2002); R. 478
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at 55.
After the jury convicted Hernandez as charged, trial counsel moved unsuccessfully
to arrest judgment, alleging insufficiency of the evidence as the sole basis (R. 180-81).
Despite knowing that he had failed to investigate Hernandez's defense witnesses, he did not
include any related allegations in his motion in arrest of judgment (R. 478 at 60).
On October 29, 2002, Judge Barrett issued an order for Qwest to provide phone
records "listing incoming calls to (307) 332-7973 for customer Margaret Puebla, that
includes telephone numbers and duration of the call for the time period of December 4,2001
to December 6, 2001," and on October 31,2002, trial counsel subpoenaed the same records
(R. 240-241).
Trial counsel did not file a motion for a new trial. Trial counsel was not familiar with
the rules governing time for filing motions for a new trial, and was unsure if he had filed one
(R. 478 at 59). He informed a secretary who questioned him about it that he had filed a
motion for a new trial four days after the verdict, but was not sure what the difference was
between a motion in arrest and motion for a new trial (R. 478 at 62).
After obtaining the phone records, trial counsel did not recognize any value in them,
because he felt there was too much of a time gap between the two calls and that Hernandez
could have run over and committed the robbery in between the two calls (R. 478 at 63-64;
Defendant's Exhibit 16). He did not see how it would be helpful to show that Hernandez was
waiting for someone to wire him money, and did not find out when Hernandez contacted his
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grandmother to wire the money, despite the fact that Hernandez had only change on him, and
no fruits of the robbery, at the time of his arrest (R. 478 at 66).
Amanda Hernandez and Margaret Puebla have always been willing to testify about
their phone conversations with Hernandez and about Puebla's sending him a wire on the
night of the robbery, but were not asked to do so prior to or after trial. See State's Exhibit
9 (Rule 23B Affidavits of Amanda Hernandez); R. 478 at 107-110, 115-117).
Despite knowing of this proof of the telephone calls and wire transfer prior to trial,
and/or prior to the deadline for filing a new trial, trial counsel did not seek to admit the
evidence at trial or in a motion for a new trial. See Rule 23B Affidavit of Trial Counsel.
With regard to the defense evidence, the trial court found that Hernandez informed
trial counsel of relatives who could serve as alibi witnesses, that trial counsel had sufficient
information to investigate these witnesses prior to trial, but that trial counsel made no
investigative efforts until after trial (R. 473).
The trial court indicated that trial counsel's failure to pursue and call Amanda
Hernandez and Margaret Puebla caused the court great concern because the preliminary
hearing and trial transcripts reflect that the robbery occurred in a narrow period of time, and
the defense evidence omitted by trial counsel may have made a significant difference (R.
474). He noted that Amanda Hernandez and Margaret Puebla were significant defense
witnesses that would have given Hernandez a stronger defense than he presented to the jury,
and concluded that Hernandez was prejudiced by the failure to investigate and call these
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witnesses (R. 475).2
FAILURE TO EXCLUDE HERNANDEZ'S CRIMINAL HISTORY
While trial counsel filed a motion in limine to exclude Hernandez's statements
concerning his prior robbery conviction and status as a parolee, and obtained a ruling on the
motion prior to trial (R. 177-178, R. 254 at 4-5), trial counsel did not address Mr.
Hernandez's prior criminal history in the motion. He testified that he had no strategic reason
for failing to include the criminal history in the motion (R. 478 at 68).
Instead, after the State's case, trial counsel indicated that before deciding if Hernandez
would testify, he wanted to know if the Hernandez's prior unarmed strong arm robbery
would be coming into evidence if Hernandez testified (R. 254 at 96). Trial counsel indicated
that the case law would not permit the prior conviction to come in, especially when the prior
crime was similar to that charged (R. 254 at 96). The court determined that the prior robbery
occurred sometime between 1993 and 1998, and said he would probably allow it to come in
(R. 254 at 96).
Trial counsel indicated that under State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986), the
extreme risk of prejudice should prevent the admission of the prior conviction (R. 254 at 97).
The court then stated,
Okay. Let me just tell you where I'm coming from here.
I think there are several factors required to be looked at in terms of

2

A copy of the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law is in the
addendum.
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whether I allow a conviction such as this strong-arm robbery to come in. I
think that the closeness in time, the same kind of activity and he's denying that
he was - I'm assuming he's going to get up and testify that he wasn't there and
it wasn't him.
(R. 97). Trial counsel agreed, and the court continued,
And I don't know that it would necessarily be that highly prejudicial
since it's a similar conduct as is alleged in this case. So that would probably
be the basis upon which I would allow Mr. Updegrove to question him about
that.
(R. 97). Trial counsel responded,
Okay. And if I could just, for the record - and I understand your ruling,
Judge, but I think that the State certainly hasn't - I don't know that they're
aware of any of the details specifically of that crime. [3] They may have a copy
of the conviction, but I understand your ruling.
(R.97).
The court then granted trial counsel five minutes to consult with Hernandez, and then

3

The record contains a factual description of Hernandez's prior robbery.
According to the federal presentence report which is included in the pleadings file,
On December 13, 1997, the defendant and his brother arrived in Cheyenne
and were involved in a crime spree where vehicles were stolen and property
was taken from others, sometimes by force. The defendant's brother was to
steal the purse of an elderly woman and they would cruise through various
parking lots in Cheyenne. On that afternoon, the defendant's brother
spotted a woman walking from a grocery store. As she approached her car,
the defendant jumped from the stolen car and grabbed her purse by way of
force, causing her to stumble and then jumped back into the car as it sped
away. The defendant's brother drove to Laramie, Wyoming, where he and
the defendant used the victim's credit card to purchase clothing at JC
Penney's. They then stole another vehicle as they made their way out of
town. The vehicle used in Cheyenne was found in Hanna, Wyoming.
(R. 189). Mr. Hernandez's testimony confirms that this is an accurate account (R. 478 at
17).
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trial counsel informed the court that they had decided that the defense would simply rest
without putting on any evidence (R. 254 at 98).
Mr. Hernandez wished to testify in his own behalf, and if he had not been dissuaded
from doing so by the prospect of having his prior robbery conviction admitted, would have
testified that he did not commit the robbery (R. 478 at 16-17, 68). He would have testified
that he was on the phone at the Flying J Truck stop, on a call to his relatives at or near the
time of the robbery, and was waiting for the money transfer from his grandmother (R. 478
at 11, 17-18).
He also established that the officers searched his bag of belongings at the outset of
their encounter with him (R. 478 at 11-12).
At the rule 23B hearing, the prosecutor testified that he had no intention whatsoever
of introducing Hernandez's criminal history in evidence, and was not prepared to impeach
Hernandez with any prior convictions at trial (R. 478 at 8). He stipulated to trial counsel's
motion in limine regarding Hernandez's statements regarding his criminal history, and would
have stipulated to excluding the entire criminal history, had trial counsel sought exclusions
(R. 478 at 8). He instructed his officers accordingly, and a note in his file indicated, "Do not
talk about felonies in Wyoming or being on paper," which referred to Hernandez's being on
parole (R. 478 at 9; Defendant's Exhibit 1).
Trial counsel testified that he thought it would have made no difference if he had filed
the motion to exclude the criminal history prior to trial, as opposed to prior to the
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presentation of the defense case (R. 478 at 82). He did not know the details of Hernandez's
prior crime (R. 478 at 83). He acknowledged that if he had moved and the prosecutor had
stipulated prior to trial to complete exclusion of Hernandez's criminal history, that would
have been better than the ultimate ruling from the trial court, and admitted that if he had filed
the motion prior to trial, he would not have researched it more than he did (R. 478 at 89).
He normally did not discover the facts of a prior crime before moving to exclude it (R. 478
at 90).
Trial counsel said he normally waited to see how the State's evidence came out before
deciding whether to call the defendant (R. 478 at 93).
The trial court acknowledged that trial counsel did not ascertain the facts of the prior
robbery before trial and that the prosecutor had testified that he had no intention whatsoever
of introducing Hernandez's criminal record at trial, either as substantive or impeachment
evidence, and was not prepared to do so (R. 472). The court then reasoned that because the
prosecutor did not say anything when trial counsel moved to exclude the prior conviction at
trial, this left a question in the trial court's mind that he may have wanted to admit the
conviction if Hernandez had testified (R. 472). The trial court found that trial counsel had
a strategic reason to wait to move to exclude the history, given his practice to see how a trial
unfolds before deciding whether to call his client as a witness (R. 472).
The court concluded without explanation that Hernandez was not prejudiced by
counsel's failure to move to exclude his criminal history prior to trial (R. 473).
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INTRODUCTION OF THE WALLET
Trial counsel put Mr. Hernandez's wallet in evidence, along with other personal
belongings of Hernandez which were seized by the police (R. 254 at 68-71). Unbeknownst
to counsel, the wallet contained a letter informing Mr. Hernandez of the identity of his
Wyoming parole/probation officer, two business cards of Wyoming parole/probation officers,
and one card for a needle exchange program, bearing a participant identification code. See
Defendant's Exhibit 18; R. 478 at 67.
The parties stipulated that the plastic bag containing Hernandez's wallet was opened
during jury deliberations; that juror Scown recalled seeing one business card from a
Wyoming parole officer in the bag with the wallet; that juror Dangerfield recalled something
in the wallet indicating that Hernandez was on parole was mentioned to her by another juror
but not personally seen by her; that juror Walther recalled seeing one business card in the bag
with the wallet but did not know what it was for; that jurors McGow, Gonzalez, and Lozano
recall seeing business cards but do not recall what they were for; that jurors Morris and Rigby
recalled seeing the wallet but did not recall seeing any business cards; and that although
jurors Dangerfield and Gonzalez recalled seeing somebody open the wallet, none of the
jurors recalled seeing anything related to Hernandez's parole status, other than as noted
above (R. 372-74).
The parties stipulated prior to trial that under Utah R. Evid. 606(b), it would be
improper to consider the subjective effect of this evidence on the jurors' deliberations (a
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courtesy copy of the stipulation is in the manilla envelope with other pleadings and exhibits).
The trial court made findings that the bag containing the wallet was opened during
deliberations, and made other findings fully consistent with the stipulation of the parties
regarding the juror access to the wallet evidence, and then concluded without explanation
that Hernandez was not prejudiced (R. 470-72).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The erroneous reasonable doubt instruction constitutes a structural error, which
requires a new trial.
The trial court was correct in recognizing that Hernandez received ineffective
assistance of counsel as a result of trial counsel's failure to investigate and call the defense
witnesses.
Trial counsel's failure to move to exclude Hernandez's criminal history prior to trial
cannot fairly be characterized as a reasonable trial tactic, given that trial counsel did not
investigate the bases for excluding the evidence prior to trial, and that the prior conviction
was not admissible. The failure to move to exclude the evidence prior to trial was
prejudicial, because the potential admission of the prior criminal history prevented
Hernandez from testifying, and because the prosecutor would have stipulated to excluding
the evidence.
Assuming that trial counsel properly waited to move for the exclusion, he should have
argued for its exclusion more thoroughly, and the trial court erred in admitting the prior
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conviction in any event.
Trial counsel's introduction of Hernandez's wallet was objectively deficient, because
it informed the jurors of his criminal past, and intimated that he had an illegal drug habit.
Given the presumption that jurors follow the instructions they are given, that Hernandez's
jurors were instructed to consider the exhibits in reaching their verdict, that multiple jurors
were aware of the prejudicial contents of the wallet, and that the unanimous verdict of all the
jurors was required for Hernandez's conviction to enter, trial counsel's introduction of the
wallet was prejudicial.
In failing to move to exclude the unreliable eyewitness identification testimony of
Nieser, and in failing to move to exclude Hernandez' gun, trial counsel performed in an
objectively deficient manner.
Given the reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result in the absence of counsel's
errors, this Court should grant a new trial.
Individually, and certainly cumulatively,4 these errors require a new trial.
ARGUMENTS
I.
THE ERRONEOUS REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTION
REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL.

4

Under the cumulative error doctrine, the Court will consider all errors, both
identified and assumed by the Court to have occurred, and will reverse if "'the cumulative
effect of the several errors undermines [the Court's] confidence . . . that a fair trial was
had.'" State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted).
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The Due Process Clause in Article I § 7 of the Utah Constitution and § 76-1-501 of
the Utah Code require the government to prove each element of a criminal offense beyond
areasonable doubt. See, State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, % 13,980 P.2d 191. Article I § 12 of
the Utah Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to have a jury find each element of a
charged criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt in order to sustain a conviction. Lopes,
1999 UT 24, % 16. Article I § 10 guarantees the criminal defendant's right to a unanimous
jury verdict as to each element of all criminal offenses. See, State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59
Tf 61, 992 P.2d 951, 967 (reversing conviction under Article I § 10 for absence of unanimity
instruction in a case wherein the jurors may have convicted defendant on different factual
theories, indicating that unanimity is necessary as to each element of an offense).
The beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof, which applies in all state criminal
trials by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, is designed to reduce the chance of criminal
convictions being premised on factual error. Cage v. Louisiana, 438 U.S. 39,39-40 (1990).
See also. State v. Reves, 2004 UT App 8 f 16, 84 P.3d 841.
The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is also required by the Fifth Amendment, and
is considered a necessary component of any valid jury verdict under the Sixth Amendment.
See, Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993); Reyes, supra.
ff

[T]aken as a whole, the instructions [must] correctly conve[y] the concept of

reasonable doubt to the jury." Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954); Reyes.
To satisfy longstanding Utah law, a reasonable doubt instruction must pass a three part
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test:
First, "the instruction should specifically state that the State's proof must
obviate all reasonable doubt." Second, the instruction should not state that a
reasonable doubt is one which "would govern or control a person in the more
weighty affairs of life," as such an instruction tends to trivialize the decision
of whether to convict. Third, "it is inappropriate to instruct that a reasonable
doubt is not merely a possibility," although it is permissible to instruct that a
"fanciful or wholly speculative possibility ought not to defeat proof beyond a
reasonable doubt."
State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1232 (Utah 1997), overruled on other grounds. State v.
Weeks. 2002 UT 98 f 25 n.l 1, 61 P.3d 1000.
Ifjury instructions do not accurately inform the jury regarding the legal definition of
reasonable doubt, this constitutes a structural error requiring reversal without regard to
evidentiary prejudice, because if a jury is instructed erroneously on the reasonable doubt
standard, there is no constitutionally valid jury verdict to which a reviewing court can apply
harmless error analysis. Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279-280. See, also, Reyes; Lopes, supra.
Denial of the basic protection of the right to a jury verdict premised on an accurate
understanding of the legal meaning of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard constitutes a
structural error which defies traditional harmless error analysis, because it is not possible to
assess the effects of the deprivation of the right. Sullivan at 281-82.5

Structural errors are those which are exempt to normal harmless error analysis,
because they do not merely affect the evidentiary balance of a case, but affect the overall
framework of a trial, and the trial itself from start to finish. See, e.g., Arizona v.
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1991). Such errors are "necessarily unquantifiable
and indeterminate," see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 282 (1993), and thus do not
lend themselves to an evidence-based harmless error analysis. See, id.
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Judge Barrett gave the jurors this reasonable doubt instruction copied in the addendum
to this brief (R. 138).
Like the reasonable doubt instruction found to constitute structural error in State v.
Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, 84 P.3d 841, the instruction failed to comport with the requirements
of State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997), supra, because the instruction did not

Structural errors involve "basic protections," in the absence of which "a criminal
trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence,
and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair." Fulminante, at 30709.
Utah has its own examples of structural error, or situations in which reversal is
automatic without regard to evidentiary prejudice. For example, in State v. Bennett, 2000
UT 34, 999 P.2d 1, the court reaffirmed the rule of Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341, 345
(Utah 1980), that if a defendant is tried in prison clothing, and the trial court does not
make a record of the circumstances justifying the defendant's attire, automatic reversal is
required. E.g. Bennett at ^j 3-4, 7.
The court based the Chess automatic reversal rule on the fact that the right not to
appear in prison clothing is a fundamental one, essential to the presumption of innocence
and to having the verdict based on the evidence, rather than on prejudice. Chess, 617
P.2d at 344-345. The court recognized that the per se reversal rule was necessary because
trying a defendant in prison clothes is fundamentally unfair, and because the prejudice
flowing from trial in prison clothes could not be measured with a traditional analysis of
evidentiary prejudice. See id.
In State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992), the court held that automatic reversal
is warranted if appointed defense counsel also acts as a prosecutor in same county. Id. at
859. The court'sper se reversal requirement in this context was based on conscious and
subconscious conflicts that a lawyer would feel while filling these dual roles, which might
impede his performance as defense counsel, and on the likelihood that defendants would
be reticent to confide in defense counsel also serving as a prosecutor. The court also
required per se reversal because the dual service "creates an appearance of impropriety
which diminishes public confidence in the criminal justice system." Id. at 857-58.
Utah law also requires automatic reversal for violations of the right to a public
trial, see, e.g.. State v. Jordan, 196 P. 565, 568 (Utah 1921); and for the absence of
accurate elements instructions, see, e.g.. State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33 (Utah 1980).
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contain the essential phrase "'proof beyond reasonable doubt obviates all reasonable doubt'"
and did contain the impermissible language indicating that reasonable doubt is not one that
is merely possible. Compare R. 398, supra, with Reyes, at f 11.
Given the dubious nature of the State's case against Hernandez, a case hinging on
unreliable eyewitness testimony, wherein Hernandez was arrested shortly after the robbery
without the victim's money or wallet, the State could not prove the constitutional error
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in the event that harmless error analysis applied. See,
Statement of Facts, supra.
Because there is no constitutionally valid conviction upon which to apply harmless
error analysis, and because the evidentiary prejudice stemming from the erroneous reasonable
doubt instruction cannot accurately be assessed, the error constitutes a structural one,
requiring reversal. See, Sullivan; Reyes; and Lopes, supra.
To the degree that trial counsel did not preserve the issue discussed above, this Court
should nonetheless address and correct the error under the exceptional circumstances, plain
error and/or ineffective assistance of counsel doctrines.
Courts utilize the extraordinary circumstances doctrine in cases involving "'rare
procedural anomalies,'" as a "'safety device'" to avoid manifest injustice.

State v.

Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, f 23, 497 Utah Adv. Rep. 23.
The plain error doctrine requires a showing that an obvious and harmful error
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occurred which prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights, although the obviousness prong
may be relaxed when a highly prejudicial error occurred which is more obvious in hindsight
than it likely was before the trial court. See, e.g.. State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29,35 and n.8
(Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989). Constitutional errors are particularly appropriate
for correction under the plain error doctrine. See, e.g.. United States v. Lindsay, 184 F.3d
1138, 1140 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 145 L.Ed.2d 343 (1999).
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment and
Article I § 12, Hernandez must demonstrate that trial counsel's performance fell below
objectively reasonable standards of representation, and that this objectively deficient
performance was prejudicial. See e ^ Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah), cert.
denied 513 U.S. 966(1994).
One of the most basic duties of a trial lawyer is to properly raise and preserve all
issues in the lower court. See, e ^ , State v. Smedlev, 2003 UT App 79 at f 10,67 P.3d 1005.
When a defense lawyer fails to assert beneficial law and seek accurate jury instructions based
on the current law, this constitutes objectively deficient performance, which will not be
excused by this Court with hypothetical tactical bases. See, State v. Moritzsky, 771 P.2d 688,
692 (Utah App. 1989) (trial counsel's failure to seek jury instruction reflecting current law
beneficial to the client was objectively deficient oversight of the law, which could not
conceivably have been valid trial strategy).
The jury instructions were not snap decisions that were made in the heat of battle with
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the jury present, but could and should have been researched and studied well in advance of
this serious first degree felony trial.
Accurate reasonable doubt instructions are a fundamental cornerstone of every
criminal case. See, e ^ , State v. Reves, 2004 UT App 81J16, 84 P.3d 841.
State v. Robertson. 932 P.2d 1219,1232(Utah 1997), which set forth the unique three
part test for Utah reasonable doubt instructions, and the case upon which it was premised,
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989), were both published years before this trial.
Just as the lower court should have followed the controlling law, the trial lawyer had
the duty to assert the law and issues on Hernandez's behalf, and counsel's failure to object
to the plain errors constituted objectively deficient performance.

See, e.g., Smedley;

Moritzsky, supra.
Assuming arguendo that the error discussed above were not viewed as plain, this
Court has the authority to recognize highly prejudicial errors, which are better understood in
hindsight than they were at the time of trial, see, e ^ , Eldredge, supra, and should do so in
this case because the error was so prejudicial.
Hernandez was structurally and fundamentally prejudiced by the erroneous jury
instruction on reasonable doubt, because the instruction deprived him of a constitutionally
valid and unanimous jury verdict finding each element of the offense of conviction proved
beyond a reasonable doubt in a case hinging on questionable eye-witness identification
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testimony, and undermined by the fact that Hernandez did not have the fruits of the robbery
(over $700) at the time of his arrest, when he was found waiting at the Flying J Truck Stop,
waiting for a $45 wire transfer from his grandmother.
Such critical and fundamental procedural errors, which do not lend themselves to
traditional harmless error analysis, see, Sullivan, supra, qualify for treatment under the
exceptional circumstances doctrine. See, State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, ^| 23,497
Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (courts utilize the extraordinary circumstances doctrine in cases involving
"'rare procedural anomalies,'" as a "'safety device'" to avoid manifest injustice).
II.
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL
REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL.
A. FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE AND PRESENT KEY DEFENSE EVIDENCE
Every criminal defendant has several related federal constitutional rights to present
a complete defense to criminal charges against him. See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683
(1985)(" Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
or in the Compulsory Process of confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the
Constitution guarantees criminal defendants fa meaningful opportunity to present a complete
defense.1... We break no new ground in observing that an essential component of procedural
fairness is an opportunity to be heard.")(citations omitted).
The Constitution of Utah provides parallel protection. An essential element of due
process provided by article I section 7 of the Utah Constitution is the "fair opportunity to
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submit evidence." Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314,317 (Utah 1945). "[T]he defendant's
right to present all competent evidence in his defense is a right guaranteed by the due process
clause of our State Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 7[.]" State v. Harding, 635 P.2d 33, 34 (Utah
1981). Article I section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides numerous trial rights which
also pertain. It states,
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases.
(Emphasis added).
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 similarly provides,
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled:
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel;
(c) To testify in his own behalf;
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance ofwitnesses in his behalf[.]
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that a trial lawyer's failure to investigate
potential defense witnesses constitutes clearly deficient performance and cannot be
considered a legitimate tactical decision. State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 188-189 (Utah
1990).
As the court in Templin recognized, the appellate court need not speculate as to how
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a jury might have assessed the credibility of defense witnesses that trial counsel failed to
investigate. If the proffer of their testimony establishes prejudice, ineffective assistance of
trial counsel is established. Id. at 188-189.
In the instant matter, Hernandez's aunt, Amanda Hernandez, has always been willing
to testify that on the night of December 5, 2001, she was talking on the phone with
Hernandez from approximately 6:22 p.m. to 6:29 p.m., and there are phone records verifying
that someone at the Flying J Truck stop was on the phone with someone at her house at this
time. See Statement of Facts, supra. This evidence, placing Hernandez at the Flying J at or
near the time when the robbery occurred,6 was strongly corroborative of his defense, that he
was at the Flying J when the robbery happened, and that Nieser was mistaken in identifying
him as the robber.
Hernandez's grandmother has always been willing to testify that Hernandez called her
on the evening of December 5,2001, and asked her to send him a wire transfer, and there are
phone records confirming that someone at the Flying J was on the phone with someone at her
house at 6:53 on December 5,2001. There are also records verifying that she sent a Western
Union money transfer to Hernandez in the amount of $45 on the night of the robbery.
See Statement of Facts, supra. This evidence was also strongly corroborative of Hernandez's
6

Dispatch broadcast Nieser's complaint to the police at 6:39 (R. 254 at 49-52).
According to Nieser's preliminary hearing and trial testimony, the robbery began at about
6:30 and lasted four to five minutes, and he waited between five and ten minutes before
he went inside to report it (R. 254 at 12-15, 19-20, R. 253 at 5). Subtracting the nine to
fourteen minutes the robbery and recovery period took up from the dispatch time of 6:39 leads to
the conclusion that the robbery began between and 6:25 and 6:30.
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defense, and of what Hernandez told the police, that on the night of December 5, he did not
rob Nieser of over $700, but was at the Flying J Truck stop waiting for a Western Union
telegram.
If Mr. Hernandez got off the phone with his aunt at 6:29, and ran blocks in one minute
to commit a robbery at the Freeway Transmission at 6:30, wherein he took over $700, why
was he back at the Flying J at 6:53 without the over $700 and calling his grandmother to wire
him $45?
Where the only evidence connecting Hernandez to the robbery was the unreliable
eyewitness identification testimony of Nieser, where Hernandez did not match the robber's
description, and where Hernandez was seized by the police about thirty minutes after the
robbery and did not have the $700 plus dollars taken in the robbeiy, evidence confirming that
he was at the Flying J up to a minute before the robbery happened, and waiting around the
Flying J to get $45 shortly after the robbery, as he told the police, could easily have made
the difference between a verdict of guilty and a verdict of not guilty. Cf. State v. Templin,
805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990)(conviction reversed for ineffective assistance of trial counsel in
part because counsel failed to call witnesses to bolster the defendants testimony).
Trial counsel had no strategic reason for failing to prepare for trial, Templin, or for
failing to move for a continuance to facilitate trial preparation, see Rule 23B Affidavit of
Trial Counsel.
Trial counsel should have investigated this evidence prior to trial, and moved to
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continue the trial until he was prepared to try the case. See Templin, supra.
At a minimum, once trial counsel realized after the trial that the evidence needed for
Hernandez's defense was wholly neglected to be presented at trial, counsel should have
moved the trial court to order a new trial on the basis of his own ineffective assistance, or
should have conflicted off the case to permit conflict counsel to do so under Utah R. Crim.
P. 24(b) and (c). Compare Tillman v. Cook. 855 P.2d 211, 221 (Utah)(noting that Utah
attorneys had historically complied with their ethical obligations to argue their own
ineffective assistance), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 1050 (1994); with State v. Labrum. 881 P.2d
900, 907 (Utah App.)(counsel should consider withdrawing from case so alternate counsel
can pursue claims of ineffective assistance), reversed on other grounds, 925 P.2d 937 (Utah
1996). Ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to investigate and present necessary
defense witnesses is a proper basis for granting a new trial. See generally Templin, 805 P.2d
182 (Utah 1990)(reversing trial court's denial of motion for new trial, which was filed by
new counsel, who alleged that trial counsel's failure to investigate and present necessary
defense witnesses constituted ineffective assistance of counsel).
Because the trial court was correct in finding that trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance, this Court should order a new trial.
B. FAILURE TO EXCLUDE HERNANDEZ'S CRIMINAL HISTORY
On of the most fundamental criminal defense rights provided by our constitutions and
code is the defendant's right to testify. See, e.g.. Crane v. Kentucky: Harding; Christiansen;
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and Utah Code Ann. § 77-1 -6, supra. In the instant case, Mr. Hernandez did not exercise this
right, as a result of trial counsel's deficient performance.
Trial counsel filed a motion in limine prior to trial, and obtained a ruling thereon (R.
177-178, R. 254 at 4-5), but failed to address Mr. Hernandez's criminal history in the motion
in limine. After the State rested, trial counsel obtained a ruling from the trial court that if
Hernandez testified, his prior robbery would likely come in as impeachment evidence (R. 254
at 96). Based on this ruling, trial counsel and Hernandez conferred and decided Hernandez
would not testify (R. 254 at 96, 98).
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12 (b)(2) requires motions to suppress evidence to
be filed five days prior to trial. While trial courts have the discretion to grant untimely
motions, e ^ Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(d), in raising issues orally in the trial
courts, trial attorneys must be thorough in making clear and specific objections. See State
v. Smedlev. 2003 WL 1343285, 2003 UT App 79 at f 10, supra.
In the instant matter, trial counsel did not provide the trial court with a factual
description of Hernandez's prior robbery at the time he moved to suppress it, but only alluded
to the possibility that the prosecution may not have known the facts underlying the prior
robbery (R. 254 at 96).
The record contains a factual description of Hernandez's prior robbery. According
to the federal presentence report which is included in the pleadings file, and was apparently
faxed to trial counsel the day after the conviction (R. 183),
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On December 13,1997, the defendant and his brother arrived in Cheyenne and
were involved in a crime spree where vehicles were stolen and property was
taken from others, sometimes by force. The defendant's brother was to steal
the purse of an elderly woman and they would cruise through various parking
lots in Cheyenne. On that afternoon, the defendant's brother spotted a woman
walking from a grocery store. As she approached her car, the defendant
jumped from the stolen car and grabbed her purse by way of force, causing her
to stumble and then jumped back into the car as it sped away. The defendant's
brother drove to Laramie, Wyoming, where he and the defendant used the
victim's credit card to purchase clothing at JC Penney's. They then stole
another vehicle as they made their way out of town. The vehicle used in
Cheyenne was found in Hanna, Wyoming.
(R. 189). Mr. Hernandez's testimony confirms that these facts are accurate (T. 478 at 17).
Under Utah Rule of Evidence 609, the prior robbery conviction would not have been
admissible to impeach Hernandez in the event that he testified, because robberies are not
considered crimen falsi, and the facts of the prior robbery do not involve deception. See,
e.g.. State v. Wight 765 P.2d 12, 17-19 (Utah App. 1988).
Contrary to the trial court's rationale that the jurors would be less likely to be
prejudiced by the prior crime because it was the same as the offense charged (R. 254 at 97),
the fact that the prior crime was a robbery, the same offense charged here, weighed heavily
against its admission under the criteria set forth in State v. Banner. 717 P.2d 1325, 1334
(Utah 1986):
[1] the nature of the crime, as bearing on the character for veracity of the
witness.
[2] the recentness or remoteness of the prior conviction....
[3] the similarity of the prior crime to the charged crime, insofar as a close
resemblance may lead the jury to punish the accused as a bad person.
[4] the importance of credibility issues in determining the truth in a
prosecution tried without decisive nontestimonial evidence....
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[5] the importance of the accused's testimony, as perhaps warranting the
exclusion of convictions probative of the accused's character for veracity.
Applying the Banner analysis correctly confirms that Hernandez's prior robbery
conviction should have been excluded prior to trial. The nature of the crime did not bear on
Hernandez's character for veracity. The prior crime happened on December 13,1997, nearly
four years before the Nieser robbery on December 5,2001 (R. 254 at 12-13). While the facts
of the two robberies were quite disparate, the fact that the offenses were both robberies
weighed heavily against admission because of the likelihood that the jurors would convict
in this case on a theory of criminal propensity. See Banner at 1334, n.44 ('"Consideration
of the testimony's prejudicial effect is especially pertinent when the witness is the defendant
in a criminal prosecution or a party in a civil case. This is particularly important when, as
here, the prior conviction is for the same type of crime involved in the matter under present
consideration. In this type of situation, the probative value of the evidence as affecting the
party's credibility will rarely outweigh the resulting confusion of the issues in dispute and
the prejudice to the party, "'Xcitation omitted; emphasis by the Banner court).
In this case, there was no dispositive non-testimonial evidence. Hernandez was found
within half an hour of the robbery without the fruits of the robbery, and did not match the
description of the robber. The only thing tying him to the crime was the unreliable
eyewitness testimony of Nieser, who made numerous inconsistent statements about the
description of the robber.
The need for Hernandez's testimony was critical in this case, so the jurors could hear
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him deny having committed the robbery, see him face the prosecutor's cross-examination,
and have the opportunity to hear him speak and confirm that he did not sound or look
Hispanic, as Nieser said the robber was.
The prior robbery would not have been otherwise admissible under Rules of Evidence
401 through 404, because there was no legitimate non-character purpose for admitting the
prior robbery, and it was therefore inadmissible. See, e.g.. State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, fflf
21-23, 993 P.2d 837, cert denied, 145 L.Ed.2d 1088 (2000) (prior bad act evidence is
admissible only if there is a proper-non-character purpose for the evidence, if the evidence
is relevant to a material fact, and if the probative value of the evidence is not substantially
outweighed by its potential for prejudice).
The only issue for the jurors to determine in this case was the identity of the robber.
Under well established Utah law, prior bad acts are not admissible to show identity unless
they bear numerous unique factual similarities to the charged offense, and are so similar to
the charged offense as to be fairly compared as "signature-like" in quality. See State v.
Decorso, atffif2, 7-12, 27; State v. Webster, 2001 UT App 238 atffif32-35, 32 P.3d 976 at
986-87.
The prior robbery, involving Hernandez driving by as a passenger in a car and
snatching a purse, bore no "signature like" qualities with the charged armed robbery, and thus
would only have proved criminal propensity, not identity. Cf. Decorso, supra (detailing
numerous factual parallels between crime charged and extrinsic crimes properly admitted to
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prove identity); and Webster (holding that prior car theft was factually too different from
charged car theft to be admitted to prove identity).
Because the extrinsic crimes evidence in this case went more to propensity than it did
to the true facts in issue, it was not admissible under rules of evidence 404. See Decorso.
supra.
Because the admission of the prior robbery would have posed a strong likelihood that
the jurors would convict Hernandez on an inference of criminal propensity, its prejudicial
value substantially outweighed the negligible probative value of the evidence. Exclusion was
therefore in order under rule 403. See Decorso. supra.
Particularly because the admission of the prior crime would have jeopardized
Hernandez's constitutional rights to a fair trial, it should not have been admitted. See
generally, e.g.. State v. Saunders. 1999 UT 59 at ^ 15, 992 P.2d 951, 957.
Trial counsel's failure to properly present this issue prior to trial with appropriate
briefing prior to trial, or to properly argue the matter under the relevant facts and governing
law constituted objectively deficient performance, and could not have been a valid tactical
decision, given that trial counsel did not even know the underlying facts of the robbery
before making his motion at the end of the State's case. See Statement of Facts, supra.
But see, e.g.. Templin. supra (requiring trial counsel to investigate defense case).
Mr. Hernandez wished to testify in his own defense, and it was trial counsel's opinion
that it would have been in Mr. Hernandez's interest to do so, because his demeanor is
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credible and watching him testify would have helped the jurors distinguish Hernandez from
the robber described by Nieser. See Defendant's Exhibit 17 (Rule 23B Affidavits of Trial
Counsel).
Particularly given that the prosecutor would have stipulated to the exclusion of the
conviction, trial counsel's failure to move for the exclusion in timely fashion was prejudicial.
See Statement of Facts, supra.
Assuming that trial counsel properly waited to move for the exclusion, the trial court
erred in admitting the prior conviction under the governing law explained above, and the
ruling was prejudicial, because it prevented Hernandez from exercising his right to testify in
a case wherein his testimony may have made the critical difference.
Unfortunately, any benefit to be gained by exchanging Mr. Hernandez's right to testify
for protecting the jury from knowing about Hernandez's criminal past was more than
cancelled out by the trial counsel's provision of Hernandez's wallet in evidence.
C. INTRODUCTION OF THE WALLET
Despite forfeiting Hernandez's right to testify in order to avoid informing the jury of
Hernandez's prior bad acts, trial counsel offered into evidence Mr. Hernandez's wallet (R.
254 at 68-71). Unbeknownst to trial counsel, the wallet contained a letter informing Mr.
Hernandez of the identity of his Wyoming parole/probation officer, two business cards of
Wyoming parole/probation officers, and one card for a needle exchange program, bearing
a participant identification code. See Statement of Facts, supra.
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It is generally presumed that jurors follow the instructions courts give them, see, e.g..
State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d 393, 401 (Utah), cert, denied. 513 U.S. 1115 (1995), and in this
case, the trial court instructed the jurors to "consider and weigh the evidence introduced" (R.
125), to base their verdict on the evidence (R. 126), to consider exhibits as evidence (R. 129),
to reach a verdict "solely after considering the evidence that has been received during the
trial" (R. 134), and to "carefully and conscientiously consider and compare all of... the facts
and circumstances," (R. 142). Finally, the jurors were instructed,
Each of you, as jurors, after considering all the evidence in the case, must
determine the defendant's innocence or guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
(R. 157).
The trial court's findings accurately reflect that multiple jurors were aware of the
contents of Hernandez's wallet and that at least one of the jurors inferred from the contents
that Hernandez was on parole. Given the requirement of unanimous jury verdicts in this
State, Constitution of Utah, Article I § 10, the one prejudiced juror could have made the
difference.
Trial counsel's mistakenly informing the jurors of Hernandez's criminal activities by
informing them that he was either on parole or probation, and that he was also carrying a
needle exchange program participant card, without giving the jurors any legal instructions
for a proper application of such evidence, virtually guaranteed that the jurors would convict
Hernandez on a theory of criminal propensity. But see, e.g., Saunders, DeCorso, supra.
The government's case was a highly suspect eyewitness identification case. Had the
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jurors had the opportunity to hear and see Hernandez testify, and/or been protected from the
tainting effects of the contents of Hernandez's wallet, there is a reasonable probability of a
different result. See State v. Gallegos 967 P.2d 973,976 (Utah 1998)(trial counsel's failure
to renew suppression motion constituted ineffective assistance of counsel) and State v.
Snyder, 860 P.2d 351 (Utah App. 1993)(reversing two convictions for lewdness involving
a child because trial counsel failed to timely file motion to suppress statements taken in
violation of Miranda).
D. FAILURE TO MOVE TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE FROM UNLAWFUL SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES
As is detailed in the Rule 23B Affidavit of Trial Counsel which was admitted at the
23B hearing, trial counsel did not file motions to suppress Mr. Hernandez's gun, statements
to the police or eyewitness identifications, and had no strategic reason for abstaining from
filing such motions.
A motion to suppress should have been filed to address the police violation of the
Fourth Amendment, as established herein.
Where a police officer validly stops an individual for investigatory or
other purposes and reasonably believes that the individual may be armed and
dangerous, the officer may conduct a "frisk" or "pat-down" search of the
individual to discover weapons that might be used against him.
State v. Carter. 707 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah 1985).
At the time of the lower court proceedings in this case, basic Fourth Amendment law
required proof of one of two factual bases to justify a Terry frisk:
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In the first, facts and circumstances unique to the particular suspect and/or
factual context may give rise to a reasonable suspicion the suspect may be
armed, such as a suspect with a bulge in his clothing that appears to be a
weapon or a suspect who is hesitant in denying that he is armed and
aggressively approaches the officer immediately upon being stopped. In the
second scenario, it is not so much the peculiarities of the suspect and
circumstances as it is the inherent nature of the crime being investigated that
leads to the reasonable suspicion that the suspect may be armed.
State v. Warren, 2001 UT App 346 at ^j 15, 37 P.3d 270, 273 (citation omitted).
In the instant matter, there were no facts in the preliminary hearing or trial that
indicated that Hernandez was behaving in a suspicious or dangerous manner in his dealings
with the investigating officers. Rather, he was fully cooperative.
While armed robbery is inherently one leading to a reasonable suspicion that the
perpetrator would be armed, Warren, the law requires that a suspect "substantially match"
the assailant's description in order to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that a suspect is the
assailant. See, e.g., Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 953
P.2d 449 (Utah 1997). In this case, Hernandez did not substantially match the suspect's
description.
Nieser consistently described the robber as appearing Hispanic (R. 253 at 5, 8). The
arresting officer conceded that Hernandez does not appear Hispanic, but looks Caucasian (R.
253 at 22).
Nieser told dispatch that the robber was five feet eight inches to five feet ten inches
tall, and weighed about one hundred and sixty pounds (R. 254 at 21-22, 38). Hernandez is
five feet four inches tall, and a week after his arrest, Hernandez weighed one hundred and
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forty five pounds (R. 254 at 75).
Nieser told dispatch that the robber was wearing a blue shirt, but the shirt that was
visible on Hernandez when the police frisked him was black (R. 254 at 26, 41, 52-53).
Nieser maintained that the robber ran Eastbound (R. 253 at 4). Hernandez was located
at the Flying J Truck stop, Southbound from the robbery (R. 253 at 12-16). In any event,
one's mere proximity to the scene of a crime does not give rise to a reasonable suspicion of
participation in that crime. See, e.g.. State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987); State
v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986).
When the police initially approached Hernandez and prior to their announcement of
their intent to frisk him, Hernandez was fully cooperative, following the police out of the
television lounge into the hallway, explaining what he was doing at the Flying J, and telling
them without any described nervousness or suspiciousness that he had no gun (R. 254 at 5657).
On these facts, the police had no reasonable suspicion that Hernandez was the robber
to justify a frisk of Hernandez, and all fruits resulting from the unlawful frisk, including
Hernandez's gun and statements and subsequent identification, should have been suppressed.
See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)(evidence derived from illegal
searches and seizures should be suppressed).7 The relevant test under Wong Sun is

7

In I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984), the Court stated,
The "body" or identity of a defendant or respondent in a criminal or
civil proceeding is never itself suppressible as a fruit of an unlawful arrest,
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'" whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant
objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.'" 371 U.S. at 487-88 (citation
omitted).
As the affidavit of trial counsel confirms, trial counsel did not consider filing a motion
to suppress Mr. Hernandez's gun and statements to the police, and considered but did not file
a motion to suppress the eyewitness identification of Hernandez, and had no strategic basis
for failing to do so. See Rule 23B Affidavit of Trial Counsel.
When there is no conceivable strategic basis for failing to pursue motions, objectively

even if it is conceded that an unlawful arrest, search, or interrogation
occurred. See Gerstein v. Push, 420 U.S. 103. 119(1975): Frisbie v.
Collins. 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952); United States ex rel. Bilokumskv v.
Tod. [263 U.S. 149, 153 (1923)].
Id. at 1039-40.
While some courts have interpreted this dicta as an indication that no evidence
bearing on the defendant's identity may be suppressed, see e,g. United States v. GuzmanBruno. 27 F.3d 420 (9th Cir.). cert, denied. 513 U.S. 975 (1994), these decisions are
poorly reasoned and fail to recognize that this portion of Lopez-Mendoza. like the three
cases it cites, stands for the unremarkable proposition that a criminal defendant is not
immune from criminal prosecution merely because his arrest was illegal.
Consistent with such precedents as Hayes v. Florida. 470 U.S. 811
(1985)(fingerprints obtained by illegal detention should have been suppressed); and Davis
v. Mississippi. 394 U.S. 721 (1969)(same); the Tenth Circuit has recognized that evidence
bearing on identity is subject to suppression. See United States v. Parra, 2 F.3d 1058,
1068 (10th Cir.)(defendant's concession of his identity should have been suppressed
under Miranda, but error was harmless), cert, denied. 510 U.S. 1026 (1993); United States
v. Alarcon-Gonzales, 73 F.3d 289 (10th Cir. 1996) (defendant motion to suppress
following his statement of his name and remarks concerning origin and immigration
status and subsequent INS investigation should have been suppressed because they were
the product of an illegal detention).
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deficient performance is established. See, Gallegos, and Snyder, supra.
There is a reasonable likelihood of a different result had the motion been filed,
because the motion had merit, and if the government would not have had the gun, Mr.
Hernandez's statements, and the eyewitness identification of Hernandez as the robber, the
government would have had no case. See Gallegos and Snyder, supra.
E. FAILURE TO MOVE TO
IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY

SUPPRESS

UNRELIABLE

EYEWITNESS

As noted above, trial counsel did not file a motion to suppress Hernandez's eyewitness
identification, and had no strategic reason for this failure. Thus, he failed to call upon the
prosecution to meet its burden to establish the reliability of the identification, and failed to
call upon trial court to exercise his gatekeeping function, mandated by Article I § 7 of the
Utah Constitution, to scrutinize eyewitness identification testimony to insure that jurors were
not unduly influenced by unreliable evidence. See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 778-79
(Utah 1991)(establishing unique trial court role in excluding unreliable eyewitness
identification testimony).
Such a motion would have had merit under the governing law.
The relevant factors for courts to consider in assessing the reliability of eyewitness
identifications are set forth in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), as follow:
"(1) The opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; (2) the
witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event; (3) the
witness's capacity to observe the event, including his or her physical and
mental acuity; (4) whether the witness's identification was made spontaneously
and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the product of
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suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being observed and the likelihood
that the witness would perceive, remember and relate it correctly."
Id. at 781 (quoting State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483, 493 (Utah 1986)).
The Ramirez Court explained the analysis as follows:
The fourth reliability factor is whether the witness's identification was
made spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter or whether it was a
product of suggestion. Here, relevant circumstances include the length of time
that passed between the witness's observation at the time of the event and the
identification of defendant; the witness's mental capacity and state of mind at
the time of the identification; the witness's exposure to opinions, descriptions,
identifications, or other information from other sources; instances when the
witness or other eyewitnesses to the event failed to identify defendant;
instances when the witness or other eyewitnesses gave a description of the
actor that is inconsistent with defendant; and the circumstances under which
defendant was presented to the witness for identification.
Id. at 783 (citations omitted).
In the instant matter, the robbery took place when it was dark (R. 253 at 8,14, R. 254
at 34). Nieser was either staring down the barrel of the gun (R. 254 at 34-35) or noticing the
assailant's clothes (R. 254 at 21). Nieser had suffered from two heart attacks the year before
the robbery, and at the time of the robbery was very stressed with "sky high" blood pressure
and concern that he was going to have another heart attack (R. 253 at 1-2, 8, R. 254 at 19-20,
36). Nieser's descriptions of the assailant varied over time, and did not match Hernandez.8
8

Nieser told dispatch that the robber was a male Hispanic, about twenty years old,
five feet eight inches tall or five feet ten inches tall and weighing about one hundred and
sixty pounds (R. 254 at 21-22, 38).
At the preliminary hearing, he said the robber was about the same height as Nieser,
5'7" or 5'8", and weighed 130 to 140 pounds (R. 253 at 5, 12).
At trial, Nieser testified he was wearing one inch heels during the robbery, and had
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Nieser's ultimate identification of Hernandez occurred when Hernandez was
presented alone, in a show-up, wherein he was handcuffed and spotlighted by the police,

testified at the preliminary hearing that the robber was his height, 57" or 5f8" (R. 254 at
31, 37-38), but could not recall having told the dispatcher that the robber's height was
between 5f8M and 5'10" (R. 254 at 38). The robber was just over an arm's length away
from him, and he stared at him for several minutes and believed the person was the same
height as he is (R. 254 at 46).
Hernandez is 5f4" (R. 254 at 75).
At the preliminary hearing, Nieser testified that the robber wore a blue shirt with
writing across the side or front of it in letters three to four inches tall (R. 253 at 5, 10).
At trial, Nieser maintained that the writing was across the front of the shirt, and that the
preliminary hearing transcript was wrong to indicate that he ever said it was across the
side (R. 254 at 42).
Officer Brede testified that the dispatch operator indicated that the robber was
wearing white athletic shoes (R. 253 at 21), contrary to Nieser's preliminary hearing
testimony that he did not notice the robber's shoes or provide a shoe description to the
police (R. 253 at 13). At trial, Nieser testified that the robber was wearing white tennis
shoes (R. 254 at 23). Nieser did not remember having had no recall of shoes at the
preliminary hearing (R. 254 at 39). He remembered telling dispatch about the shoes, but
later may have forgotten that detail (R. 254 at 39).
Nieser acknowledged at trial that at the preliminary hearing, he had testified that
he thought the robber was Hispanic because of his goatee and hairdo, and also recalled
denying that a certain hairdo and goatee meant a person was Hispanic (R. 254 at 44). He
did not recall having said that he thought the suspect was Hispanic because his heart rate
was up and it was dark at Freeway Transmission (R. 254 at 44), but that was indeed his
testimony at the preliminary hearing (R. 253 at 8). When defense counsel alluded to
Nieser's preliminary hearing testimony regarding why the robber looked Hispanic and
asked him why he did, Nieser testified, "I don't know, he just did. He looked Hispanic to
me." (R. 254 at 37).
He did not tell dispatch about scarring or jewelry, but Hernandez' forehead was
scarred, and he had an earing in his left ear on the night of his arrest (R. 254 at 45).
The dispatch report originating from Nieser indicated that the robber's gun was
black (R. 254 at 74). At the preliminary hearing, he described the gun as grey with some
silver or chrome on it (R. 253 at 1-3, 9). At trial, he identified the gun the police seized
from Hernandez as the robber's gun, despite the fact that the gun is not black and has no
silver or chrome (R. 254 at 34-35).
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about a half hour after the robbery (R. 235 at 7; R. 254 at 24, 39, 57, 76).
The most telling fact about the suggestiveness of the show-up was Nieser's memory
of what preceded it. He testified that he saw the police driving around the neighborhood of
Freeway Transmission within a couple of minutes of his call, and they stopped about five
minutes later (R. 254 at 36). Detective Wallace and another officer came and got him about
half an hour after the robbery and told him they "had a suspect that fit the description and
wanted to know if [Nieser] could ID him." (R. 254 at 23-24, 44).
Given these facts, the prosecution should have been put to its burden to demonstrate
that Nieser's identification of Hernandez was reliable, and the trial court should have been
called upon to perform his gatekeeping function, to screen out unreliable eyewitness
identification testimony. See Ramirez, supra.
There was, and could have been, no legitimate trial strategy to abstain from
challenging Nieser's unreliable eyewitness identification of Hernandez, and the failure to
pursue this in the trial court constituted objectively deficient performance. See Smedley,
Gallegos, and Snyder, supra.
There is a reasonable likelihood of a different result here, given that the police found
no money and no property of the victim on Hernandez, that Hernandez did not match the
robber's description, and that Hernandez's gun did not match Nieser's descriptions of the
robber's gun.
In State v. Maestas, 984 P.2d 376 (Utah 1999), the court reversed eight counts of
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aggravated robbery because the case hinged on shaky eye-witness identification testimony,
and yet trial counsel there failed to request a jury instruction cautioning the jurors on the
unreliability of eyewitness identification testimony, and failed to challenge police testimony
bolstering the reliability of eyewitness identification testimony which was lacking proper
foundation. See kL at 3 80-81.
Comparison of the facts of this case with those in Maestas demonstrates how
Hernandez was prejudiced by trial counsel's errors. See, id. at 381-82 (finding prejudicial
error where trial counsel failed to request cautionary instruction when mistaken identification
was the heart of the defense, and where other evidence sustaining the verdict was
inconclusive).
In the instant matter, Mr. Hernandez's defense was that he was not the robber. When
the police approached him half an hour after the robbery, he went with them willingly and
spoke with them after Miranda, consistently maintaining his innocence. He did not have the
money from the robbery, or any of the victim's property. The eyewitness identification was
subject to suppression altogether in this case. Thus, the failure of trial counsel to wholly
avoid the harm of unreliable eyewitness identification evidence in this case by moving to
suppress it was even more prejudicial than it was in Maestas. See id.
Conclusion
This Court should reverse Hernandez's conviction and order a new trial.
DATED this June 23, 2004.
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i. Hernandez
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I have caused to be mailed first class postage prepaid, one true
and correct copy of the foregoing to Utah Attorney General Mark Shurtleff, 160 East 300
South, PO Box 140812, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0812, this June 23, 2004.
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ADDENDUM

REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTION
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ATTORNEY FOR MR. HERNANDEZ
0EPUTY CLERK

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE CITY DiiPARTIMEN I, IN \ND l'< M< S M I I AKL COUNTY
STATE O U T Ml

STATE Ol HI Ml
:
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,

Finding.-ol ia_, ami
Conclusions of Law
on 23 B Remand

v.
l)<>MINK,)!!l I' HERN AND! / .
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT.

Judge William W. Barrett

The Utah Court of Appeals remanded this matter to this Court for the entry of
findings of fact and conclusions of law on several issues.
!

:\ mg conducted a full evidentiary hearing and having reviewed the transcript of

that hearing and the exhibits admitted therein, this Court hereby enters the following
findings of fact regarding ineffective assistance of counsel.
Findings m • «v.i
1.

The evidence is insufficient to determine whether the letter or business

cards of Hernandez's parole officer were visible outside the wallet while inside an
evidence bag submitted to the jury.
2.

The plastic bag containing the wallet was opened during the deliberations

3.

The stipulation entered into by the parties accurately reflects what the Court

finds regarding the jurors' awareness of the contents of the wallet. Specifically,
a.

Juror Michael Scown recalled seeing one business card in the

plastic bag with the wallet and recalls that the business card was the card of
a Wyoming parole officer.
b.

Juror Cheiyl Dangerfield recalled that another juror

commented to her that something in the wallet indicated that defendant was
on parole. Ms. Dangerfield recalled that she did not personally see the item.
c.

Juror Rebecca Walther recalled seeing one business card in

the bag with the wallet but did not recall what the business card was for.
d.

Jurors Julie McGow, Rafael Gonzalez, and Jose Lozano

recalled seeing business cards but did not recall what they were for.
e.

Jurors James Morris and Bea Rigby recall seeing the wallet

but do not recall seeing any business cards.
f.

Although jurors Cheryl Dangerfield and Rafael Gonzalez

recall seeing somebody open the wallet, none of the jurors recall seeing
anything related to defendant's parole other than as outlined above.
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Based on this evidence, the Court concludes that Hernandez suffered no
prejudice from trial counsel's admission of the wallet.
5.

I he laa:> oi l lanandcz prior strong-arm robbery are as testing, .,- . \-

brother in a car, that they pulled into a supermarket in nwd of gas money and other
things, that Hernandez jumped out of a car and took a woman's purse from hei that
Hei nandez got ba> :k iri.t :) tl le cai ai id that 1:1: i. z] n lsed the money.
6.

Defendant's trial counsel did not ascertain the factual details of the strong-

arm robbery prior to {he trial in this case,,
7.

' i . . . ..u piuSL^i:oi testified ai m e ruie -

;> i;ut m g w.„. .,* ..^. to

intei iti :: it i \ 1: !i,a;tsoei ei of i nti ocliii ni|> H u n a n i *

substantive or impeachment evidence, and was not prepared to do so.
!.

I lowever, given that the prosecutor did not sa> ai lything when trial counsel

asked the Court at the close of the State's case regarding the admissibility of the prior

very well have wanted to bring in that strong-arm robbeiy conviction had Hernandez
testified.
9.

Diicmi.iin :> liuii counsel ,. . . , .uiak^K .^asoii L, wait to move to exclude

before deciding whether a defendant's testimony will be required.
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10.

Hernandez was not prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to file a motion in

limine seeking to exclude his strong arm robbery conviction prior to trial.
11.

Prior to trial, Hernandez informed trial counsel of relatives who could serve

as alibi witnesses.
12.

While defendant's trial counsel may not have been told the specific names

and contact information for Amanda Hernandez and Margaret Puebla until after trial, trial
counsel had enough information before trial to investigate these witnesses.
13.

Trial counsel made no efforts to locate and interview these witnesses until

after trial
14.

Amanda Hernandez would have come to the trial and testified as follows:
a.

That items 2 through 6 on page 7 of her telephone bill evidence five

telephone calls to her from payphones in Washington and Utah between the period of
December 1 and December 5, 2001, and that she believes that all those calls were from
defendant.
b.

That items 23 through 27 on page 9 of her telephone bill evidence

five additional telephone calls to her from Salt Lake City between the period of December
3 and December 5, 2001, and that all those calls were probably from defendant.
c.

That she recalls sending defendant a Western Union money gram a

few days prior to December 5, 2001, but did not know when she did so.
d.

That on December 5, 2001, she was on the telephone with defendant

4

:

fi 01 1:1 appi oxi mat z\y 6:22 p.m t a 6:29
e.

'

Ihat, during that telephone call, deleiicUnl was trying to get home lo

Wyoming from I Jtah and was obtaining her permission to charge to Amanda Hernandez's
F
f

rhat her telephone bill reflects that defendant made a telephone call

to Margaret Puebla on December 5, 2001, which began at 6:53 n in and lasted seven
n 111 1.1 ites.

g.

nihil she railed MatfMM 1 Pudila .HI u S \ m in MIMMI dull drlnidanl

had reached Margaret I 'uebla.
h
15.

r 1

"

' Margaret Puebla was on the phone with defendant at that time.

Margau'i 1 u^. .« would have come to tiu t;iai and (estilkd a> lollows:
•

:

I

-

'

-Hi

!

get home from Salt i_,cuw,.
b

H- u after the telephone call, she wired him $45 through Western

IJnion.
16.

1 1 ial • : : 1 inset's faili 11 e to pi irsi i€ at id :all 1:1 lese < * itnesses • :ai ises tt le C : 11 art

great concern.
17.

The preliminary hearing and trial transcripts demonstrate that the robbery

was com mitted during a. narrow periou *.. *...;v., an,; .: u a y have made a signin .n :
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available for Mr Hernandez's defense.
18.

Amanda Hernandez and Margaret Puebla were not alibi witnesses in the

true sense of the word because their testimony would not have established that defendant
was on the telephone with them at the same time the robbery was committed.
19.

However, Amanda Hernandez and Margaret Puebla were significant

defense witnesses that would have given defendant a stronger defense than the defense he
presented to the jury.
20.

Hernandez was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to investigate and call

these witnesses
DATED this

n

day of December, 2003^v t ,

The Hondr&ble William W. Barrett
Judge, ThinLD^strict Court

approved as to form
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Karen Klucznik
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I hereby certify that I have e-mailed and mailed, first class postage prepaid, one
true and correct copy of the foregoing to Assistant Attorney General Karen Klucznik, 160
East 300 South, PO Box 140812, Salt Lake City, Utah 841,1470812, t h i s / J J _ day of
December, 2003

C0NSTITU110NAL PROVISIONS, S'l'A'l U1HS AND RULIi

Constitution of Utah, Article I § 7
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 10
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In capital cases the jury
shall consist of twelve persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of no
fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature shall establish the number of
jurors by statute, but in no event shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In
criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors
may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded.
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 12 (2004)
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person
and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him,
to nave compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to
have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor
a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of
that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay
evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination
to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the
defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule.
United States Constitution, Amendment V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation.

11 ni i ni, led Males Constitution, Amendmei it \ "' I
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the i ifrn.
v eu> ^iu p ^ n e L ; JK
by an impartialiurv of the State and district wherein the crimhave been committed,
which district snail have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defence.
TT

*(iled States Constitution, Amendment XIV § 1
nersons born or ik.
•of. are cit; '•make *

..n. m^ ,
uu. JUHMJIUIWII
ttc wheiem tliev reside. No State
privileges or immunities of citizens

•*• I JniU
,: nor
_
y person of lite. libcrt\. or pr« »pcrty,
HII due process of law; nor deny lo an\ person with*:* ii> jurisdiction the e^ 1ill!
protection of the laws.
• ...i, \ u a . § ; 6 1 501 (200 \ )

\i) A uefendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent until each UU.K.
the offense charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of ^i™
proof the defendant shall be acquitted.
•^\ v used v •*•*

- -• «• , words "element of the offense" I I I <. -: 111:

• • * IK conduce attendant circumstances, or results of conduct proscribed, prohibited, or
forbidden in the definition .>' tV offense*
euipabf* .ifonkil state required.
he existence ofjurisdiction and venue are not elements of the offense but shall be
ed by a preponderance of the evidence.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (2004)

I I |

i | u I UII M lUililll.

il < »l n "On "i 11 1

(a) the person unlawful!) aiui intentionally takes or attempts to take personal property in
the possession of another from his person, or immediate presence, against his will, by
means of force *-i?e M . ^
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(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate force against
another in the course of committing a theft.
(2) An act shall be considered "in the course of committing a theft" if it occurs in an
attempt to commit theft, commission of theft, or in the immediate flight after the attempt
or commission.
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2004)
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601;
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the course of
committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or
in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a robbery.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (2004)
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled:
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel;
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him;
(c) To testify in his own behalf;
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him;
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf;
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district where the offense
is alleged to have been committed;
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be entitled to a trial
within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail and if the business of the court permits.
(2) In addition:
iii

(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense:
(b) No accused person shall, be I ore final judgment, be compelled to advance mone> or
fees to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or the laws of Utah, or to pay the
• = '"those rights when received;
(e) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself;
MI ) A u ifc shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a husband
• si his wife; and
(e) Nr person shun be convicted unless by verdict of a jur\. or upon a pk\* ol guilt) or no
contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by jury has been waived or, in ease of an
)ii, upon a judgment by a magistrate.
TTx 1

: - Rule of Criminal Procedure 12
:

•!• •; \it .tppii^.;..-,
! ' *i \
vi shail be v\ motion, nine!., m .
niAg a trial or heaim^ - u •-'.-•
^ JIKI in accordance with this rule. A
motion shall state succinctly and with particularity the grounds upon which it is made and
the relief sought. A motion need not be accompanied by a memorandum unless required
by the court.
(b) Request to S
IMOII. When the time for filing a response to a motion and
the reply ha.c
'™filea request to submit the motion for decision. The
request shal
(ioned "Request to Submit for Decision." The
Request to Submit for
he date on which the motion was served. 1 hedate the opposing men
^s served, the date the reply memorandum, if
any, was served, and w
:ias been requested. The notification shall contain
a certificate of mailing to all pai ues n n- • part)/ files a request, the motion will not *x
submitted for decision.
(c) Time for filing specified
\ny defense, objection or request, including request
for rulings on the aamissil
ice, which is capable of determination without i he
trial of the general issue nia> uc IUI&CU prior to trial by written motion.
(c)(1) The following shall be raised at least five days prior to the trial:
(c)(1)(A) defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment or information other
than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge an offense, which objection
shall be noticed by the court at any time during the pendency of the proceeding;
(c)(1)(B) motions to suppress evidence;
(c)(1)(C) requests for discovery where allowed;
(c)(1)(D) requests for severance of charges or defendants; or
(c)(1)(E) motions to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy.
(e)(2) Motions for a reduction of criminal offense at sentencing pursuant to Utah Code
Section 76-3-402 shall be in writing and filed at least ten days prior to the date of
encing unless the court sets the date for sentencing within ten days of the entn
\ motion made before trial shall be determined before trial unless the court 1 oi trowel
j orders that the ruling be deferred for later determination. Where factual issues are
'•" ••(] in determining a motion, the court shall state its findings on the record.
iv

(e) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to make requests
which must be made prior to trial or at the time set by the court shall constitute waiver
thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from such waiver.
(f) Except injustices1 courts, a verbatim record shall be made of all proceedings at the
hearing on motions, including such findings of fact and conclusions of law as are made orally.
(g) If the court grants a motion based on a defect in the institution of the prosecution or in
the indictment or information, it may also order that bail be continued for a reasonable
and specified time pending the filing of a new indictment or information. Nothing in this
rule shall be deemed to affect provisions of law relating to a statute of limitations.
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 24
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant a new trial in
the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse
effect upon the rights of a party.
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. The motion shall
be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in support of the motion.
If additional time is required to procure affidavits or evidence the court may postpone the
hearing on the motion for such time as it deems reasonable.
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made within 10 days after imposition of sentence, or
within such further time as the court may fix during the ten-day period.
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same position as if no trial had been
held and the former verdict shall not be used or mentioned either in evidence or in argument.

Utah Rule of Evidence 401
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.
Utah Rule of Evidence 402
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of
the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or bv these rules, or by
other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.

Utah Rule of Evidence 403
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation oi
v

cumulative evidence.
Utah Rule of Evidence 404

(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is
not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular
occasion, except:
(a)(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a trait of character of
the alleged victim of the crime is offered by the accused and admitted under Rule
404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of the accused offered by the prosecution;
(a)(2) Character of alleged victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the alleged
victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or
evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim offered by the
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged victim was the first aggressor;
(a)(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in Rules
607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case
shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses
pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to
introduce at trial.
Utah Rule of Evidence 606
(a) At the trial. A member of the jury may not testify as a witness before that jury in the
trial of the case in which the juror is sitting. If the juror is called so to testify, the
opposing party shall be afforded an opportunity to object out of the presence of the jury.
(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a
verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring
during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any
other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the
verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith,
except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information
was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was
improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may a juror's affidavit or evidence of any
statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded from
testifying be received for these purposes.
Utah Rule of Evidence 609

vi

(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
(a)(1) evidence that a witness other than the accused has been convicted of a crime shall
be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in
excess of one year under the law under which the witness was convicted, and evidence
that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the court
determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial
effect to the accused; and
(a)(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it
involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of
more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the
witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date,
unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the
conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its
prejudicial effect. However, evidence of a conviction more than ten years old as
calculated herein, is not admissible unless the proponent gives to the adverse party
sufficient advance written notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse
party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of such evidence.
(c) Effect of pardon, annulment, or certificate of rehabilitation. Evidence of a conviction
is not admissible under this rule if (1) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon,
annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure based on a finding
of the rehabilitation of the person convicted, and that person has not been convicted of a
subsequent crime which was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year,
or (2) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent
procedure based on a finding of innocence.
(d) Juvenile adjudications. Evidence of juvenile adjudications is generally not admissible
under this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal case allow evidence of a juvenile
adjudication of a witness other than the accused if conviction of the offense would be
admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and the court is satisfied that admission in
evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence.
(e) Pendency of appeal. The pendency of an appeal therefrom does not render evidence of
a conviction inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of an appeal is admissible.
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